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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
One area of considerable activity last year centered on the hypothetical
question to the medical expert - touchstone of medical proof for any
compensation claim.
The Ohio Supreme Court held that it was error to refuse to admit testi-
mony of the medical expert in reply to such a question when the doctor
stated that there was a direct causal relationship between the injury and
disability.' The question propounded had asked if there were "any" causal
relationship. The erroneous question was cured by the answer.
A similar result had been obtained several months previously when the
same court held it error to reject an answer by the physician which stated
that there was a "direct causal relationship" between the injury and dis-
ability in reply to the question of whether there was "any" relationship.2
A concurring opinion rejected the majority's third syllabus in the case
which held that the medical expert witness should be allowed to explain
his answers. The concurring judge believed that since the answer itself
cured the defective question on causation and because this issue was not
presented to the court it should not be decided. In a companion case the
Supreme Court held it was error to reject the physician's answer when the
hypothetical question inquired as to "a causal relationship." Once rejected,
however, by the lower court, the error was considered not prejudicial
enough to reverse the judgment, for the evidence proffered by the medical
expert was insufficient in itself to prove a direct causal relationship.3 One
essential element for a valid hypothetical question is the necessity to in-
troduce the facts upon which to base the question. A material variance
between the facts previously introduced and the facts stated in the ques-
tion is error. The variance was considered immaterial when the facts sub-
mitted that claimant had first noticed the effects of inhaling lint while
working on corduroy at her home after work, and the hypothetical ques-
tion propounded stated that she first noticed the effects while working.4
In a claim involving acceleration of a bronchogenic carcinoma in the right
bronchial area the evidence prior to the hypothetical question placed the
blow to the decedent's left side of the chest. The medical expert based his
reply to the question upon a blow to the right side. The court viewed this
as immaterial. 5 In most scientific considerations, however, location of the
blow in relation to the cancer is a very material consideration. 6
'Brumage v. Industrial Commission, 164 Ohio St. 255, 129 N.E.2d 844 (1955).
2 Schiele v. Industrial Commission, 162 Ohio St. 569, 125 N.E.2d 1 (1955).
'Fox v. Industrial Commission, 162 Ohio St. 569, 125 N.E.2d 1 (1955).
'Morrissey v. Industrial Commission, 128 N.E.2d 815 (Ohio App. 1954).
Glenn v. National Supply Co., 129 N.E.2d 189 (Ohio App. 1954).
[June
-SURVEY OF OHIO LAW- 1955
If the hypothetical question fails to be based on a prior presented fact
that an injury occurred, the allowance of the question is prejudicial error.
The medical expert cannot draw an inference of injury and base his reply
upon such inference.7 The issue arose in a claim for death of a painter
working in a house. He was found by a fellow-worker lying on the floor.
Blood was running from his nose; blood was also located on the shelves he
was painting. Death was determined to be the result of probable coronary
thrombosis. A further issue in this case arose over submission of the case
to the jury. Two irreconcilable inferences were advanced by opposing
parties. The claimant widow contended that the painter fell, struck his
head on the shelves, thus causing the coronary attack. Defense argued that
the workman had a fatal coronary attack, fell, then struck his head on the
shelves. The court ruled that to submit this issue to the jury would be
speculative and conjectural. The defense motion for a directed verdict
should have been sustained.
Two evidentiary matters provoked interest last year. It was held error
to exclude a death certificate stating the cause of death as coronary throm-
bosis.8 The certificate must be admitted as prima facie evidence of the
cause of death. A more perplexing case involved the death claim of a
widow for a steel worker who disappeared. No direct evidence of his
death was obtained. The worker was last seen on a lorry car in a steel
mill holding his head in his hands 70 feet from a skip bucket over the blast
furnace. He had left his lunch where he planned to eat, his street clothes
were in his locker, he never checked out, he had no domestic or financial
troubles. Gas had been leaking in that area, for another employee suffered
from it. The widow claimant theorized that her husband had been gassed,
fell into the skip bucket, dropped into the furnace and was consumed.
No direct evidence was admitted that the skip bucket had operated or
dumped its contents into the furnace. A compensation award was upheld
on this evidence.'
The requirement that the person be injured in his employment pre-
sented several unusual cases in 1955. A 77 year old elevator operator
stepped outside the elevator door, stood alongside the elevator, fell on
the floor which was not slick, fractured his skull, and died. Prior to this
time he had experienced occasional headaches, chest pains and indigestion.
'See Adelson, Injury and Carrier in SCHRoEDnn, PHsIiA IN THE COURTROOM
17 (1954).
'Burens v. Industrial Commission, 162 Ohio St. 549, 124 N.E.2d 724 (1955).
Rath v. Industrial Commission, 129 N.E.2d 525 (Ohio App. 1954).
'Washington v. Rhepublic Steel Corp., 129 N.E.2d 318 (Ohio App. 1954).
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The widow was denied compensation because the injury was held not to
have arisen out of his employment.10
A divided court also denied compensation to a worker who had no
specific lunch time and swallowed glass in a piece of pie purchased in a
restaurant on the employer's premises but operated independently. The
worker was not furnished his meals or required to eat in the restaurant.
The injury was held not to have arisen out of his employment." But can
-this decision be reconciled with the case which granted compensation to a
construction worker assaulted by other workers in a parking lot adjacent to
the place of employment? His employer, the building contractor, was con-
structing on an oil company's property and had no control over the oil
company's parking lot where the injury occurred. Nevertheless the in-
jury was held to have arisen out of the employment. 12 Could it be that in
the former case the worker might proceed against the restaurant operator
in tort or contract to get reimbursement for injury while in the latter case
such procedure against fellow-workers would not prove too successful?
In the area of disability, the claimant is not limited by the Industrial
Commission's denial of compensation because the disability of psycho-
neurosis was not proved. Her claim was based on an injury which pro-
duced a roaring noise in her ears, impaired hearing, headaches, dizziness
and loss of memory. She did not allege psychoneurosis. The trial court is
not limited to the psychoneurosis issue but can consider the other disa-
bilities and determine compensability, if any, from them.'3 Another court
instructed the jury that "continuous disability," to determine whether a
widow qualified for death benefits when her husband must be continuously
disabled from the time of injury to death, meant not being able to work
with the same degree of ease and competency as before the injury. This
charge was held valid.14  In another case the jury found no probable
causal relationship between the injury and the disability of death. The
employee was dazed when a five-pound shade fell on his head; he also
fainted shortly thereafter. He was in bed for five days and then returned
to work for a week. Five weeks later he died from sub-acute bacterial
endocarditis. Expert medical testimony on the causal relationship was con-
flicting. The verdict was held not to be against the weight of evidence. 15
Another jury in a disability issue was tripped up, however. By general
" Postel v. Industrial Commission, 163 Ohio St. 617, 128 N.E.2d 29 (1955).
' Coston v. Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp., 125 N.E.2d 736 (Ohio App. 1952).
' Pickett v. Industrial Commission, 129 N.E.2d 639 (Ohio App. 1954).
'
3 Brown v. Ternstedt Div. General Motors Corp., 128 N.E.2d 523 (Ohio App.
1954).
' Salsberry v. Industrial Commission, 124 N.E.2d 820 (Ohio App. 1953).
'Black v. Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp., 97 Ohio App. 223, 124 N.E.2d 759 (1953).
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verdict it sustained the compensability of an injury which caused the
disability of aggravating a pre-existing condition. In answer to a special
interrogatory, however, the jury said the disability was caused by exposure
to steam and smoke at work over a period of years. Since the general and
special verdicts were irreconcilable, judgment notwithstanding the verdict
should have 'been granted defendant.16
A number of primarily legal interpretations were rendered last year
under the workmen's compensation laws. The Industrial Commission
filed its notice of appeal in the common pleas court stating erroneously
that its appeal was from judgment rendered, rather than from the overruling
of a motion for directed verdict. The claimant was not surprised; the
notice can be amended; jurisdiction was attached.17 Also it is not necessary
for the defendant to move for a directed verdict at the end of claimant's case
during the rehearsing process when the record is being made. At the
common pleas court trial the defendant can so move. He is not bound
strictly to the transcript of the rehearsing record on this point.'8
The amenability issue arose concerning the salaried employee of a
business firm who hired three workers to build his private home. Since
the home was in no way connected with his salaried position he was not
employing workers in the usual course of his business. He was not, there-
fore, amenable to the law.?9
The issue again arose in 1955 whether an employee of a self-insurer
could employ his private physician in a compensation case with the medical
expenses being paid by the self-insurer. The answer was in the negative2 0
The Industrial Commission authorized the self-insurer to provide compe-
tent medical services; the self-insurer stood ready, willing and able to do so.
An additional award for violation of a safety regulation was ordered
where a worker in the basement was injured while cleaning a vertical screw
of a large mixer.2 ' The screw protruded into the basement 24 inches be-
low the main apparatus of the mixer which was located on the first floor.
A fellow-employee on the first floor inadvertently started the mixer. The
safety rule required that every room should be provided with the means of
disengaging the machinery in the room.
An action of deceit against the employer was denied last year in a
' Benchwick v. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co., 128 N.E.2d 181 (Ohio App.
1952).
'
TRichards v. Industrial Commission, 163 Ohio St. 439, 127 N.E.2d 402 (1955).
:'Roberts v. Cincinnati Gas and Electric Co., 97 Ohio App. 475, 127 N.E.2d 217
(1954).
"Phipps v. Redick, 129 N.E.2d 856 (Ohio App. 1954).
:'State ex rel Sekula v. Industrial Commission, 128 N.E.2d 457 (Ohio App. 1954).
'State ex rel Long v. Industrial Commission, 130 N.E.2d 161 (Ohio App. 1954).
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4-3 decision of the Supreme Court.22  The employer had gratuitously
offered to file the employee's claim for compensation but failed to do so.
The employee was barred because the limitations period had expired. The
majority believed that the workmen's compensation act precluded all com-
mon law actions. The dissenting judges would have allowed the action
either as a breach of contract or as a tort injury to the employee clearly out-
side the scope of the workmen's compensation act.
If an attorney and client contract with the client's employer to in-
demnify the employer for any loss occasioned by the employer's consent
to a judgment entry finding the client eligible to participate in the insur-
ance fund, the contract is void and the attorney is guilty of maintenance.2 3
The city of Toledo was denied mandamus to compel the Industrial
Commission to set aside a transfer of investment earnings from the Public
Insurance Fund of counties, cities and political subdivisions to the Private
Insurance Fund of private corporations, associations or individuals.24 The
transfer had been made on advice of the actuaries. Toledo sought to obtain
any surplus in its account over the estimated disbursements from its account
for the year. The Commission was under a duty to charge losses incurred
to the individual accounts, but it had no duty to keep records of disburse-
ments charged against individual accounts. No dear right to mandamus
appeared because there was no evidence that this transfer violated any
duty.
Ohio can invoke its real party in interest statute to bar a Kansas em-
ployee injured in a Kansas accident covered by workmen's compensa-
tion from suing the third party tortfeasor in Ohio. Under the Kansas
workmen's compensation law, one year after the incident of injury the
right of the employee to sue the third party tortfeasor is assigned to the
employer. Since this one year period had expired, the Kansas employee
was not the real party in interest.25
OLIVER SCHROEDER, JR.
'Greenwalt v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 164 Ohio St. 1, 128 N.E.2d 116
(1955).
' LoGuidice v. Harris, 98 Ohio App. 230, 128 N.E.2d 842 (1954).
" State ex rel City of Toledo v. Industrial Commission, 164 Ohio St. 12, 128 N.E.2d
72 (1955).
'Griffin v. Gar Wood Industries, 97 Ohio App. 129, 123 N.E.2d 751 (1954).
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